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Abstract-- Power grid cyber security is turning into a vital 
concern, while we are moving from the traditional power grid 
toward modern Smart Grid (SG). To achieve the smart grid 
objectives, development of Information Technology (IT) 
infrastructure and computer based automation is necessary. This 
development makes the smart grid more prone to the cyber 
attacks. This paper presents a cyber security strategy for the 
smart grid based on Human Automation Interaction (HAI) 
theory and especially Adaptive Autonomy (AA) concept. We 
scheme an adaptive Level of Automation (LOA) for Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. This level of 
automation will be adapted to some environmental conditions 
which are presented in this paper. The paper presents a brief 
background, methodology (methodology design), implementation 
and discussions. 
Index Terms—smart grid, human automation interaction, 
adaptive autonomy, cyber security, performance shaping factor 
I. NOMENCLATURE 
SG: Smart Grid 
IT: Information Technology 
HAI: Human Automation Interaction 
AA: Adaptive Autonomy 
SCADA: Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
FEP: Firewall Enhancement Protocol 
HMI: Human-Machine Interface 
EWS: Early Warning System 
HCA: Human-Centered Automation 
LOA: Level of Automation 
PSF: Performance Shaping Factor 
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IDS: Intrusion Detection Systems 
II. INTRODUCTION 
ECHNOLOGY has set a day-to-day progress in most  
industries; however, the power industry has gained less 
advantage from technology during the last decades [1].  
This lack of technology investments resulted in inefficiency of 
the whole system; On the other hand, the increasing price of 
the primary fuels draws great attentions to even slight 
inefficiencies and energy losses. 
Smart grid is introduced to apply new technologies to power 
grid, in order to make it "work far more efficiently" [2]. 
Computer based automation is one of the core technologies 
which plays an important role in the smart grid innovations 
where the SCADA is its neural system. Although this increase 
in the level of automation is for better service (e.g. reliability), 
it can be regarded as a threat for the system’s cyber-security. 
Security and reliability are not always aligned; for example 
increase in the amount of data in the IT infrastructure is 
consequences some security challenges [3]. Since our modern 
society is exceedingly dependent on reliable electrical energy, 
it is essential to ensure the security of the smart grid against 
any cyber attacks. The cyber security of the SCADA system 
has been extensively studied in recent years to overcome this 
problem. 
A cyber attack can be decomposed into three steps: first, 
attacker intends to have control over the SCADA system. 
Once the control is obtained, the attacker should identify the 
system to launch an intelligent and effective attack. At the 
third step, the attacker initiates the control of Firewall 
Enhancement Protocol (FEP), Application Server, HMI, Early 
Warning System (EWS), system’s database, and even 
controllers directly [4]. 
To prevent the attackers from gaining control of the 
SCADA system, human-automation teams will be more 
prolific than either human or automation working alone [31]. 
We present our strategy in the HAI function allocation 
framework, which was first introduced by P.M. Fitts in 1951. 
Fitts considered two levels of automation in his primary HAI 
model: manual or automatic [5]; However, since this primary 
model was no longer successful in the HAI optimization, 
Sheridan and Verplank introduced their ten-degree LOA [5]-
[10]. Further in 2000, Parasuraman, Sheridan and Wickens 
suggested the AA concept, which schemes an adaptive level of 
automation for optimizing the HAI, based on the 
environmental conditions [6], [8], [9], [11]. Further, 
Fereidunian et al introduced a model-based framework for the 
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realization of the AA concept in order to manage the HAI 
complexity [12]-[17]. 
The importance of automation in the smart grid, and the fact 
that the human manual performance cannot completely be 
replaced by the automation, raise the importance of illustrating 
Human-Centered Automation (HCA) and the HAI positioning 
in the smart grid innovations. This paper outlines an adaptive 
level of automation for the SCADA systems, based on the 
changing environmental conditions. These environmental 
conditions affect the system’s security and its vulnerability to 
the cyber attacks. 
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows: a brief 
background on the HAI and AA concepts are presented. Later, 
a framework is proposed for improving the cyber security 
based on the AA. Afterward, the concept has been 
implemented on sample situations, followed by a discussion in 
the final step. The paper is concluded at the end. 
 
III. BACKGROUND 
This section is intended to briefly introduce the main 
concepts of HAI, LOA, AA, and Performance Shaping Factor 
(PSF), in order to make this paper self-explanatory. However, 
to the readers who are less familiar with the concepts, we 
suggest [6], [10], [13] for further reading. 
A. Human Automation Interaction 
Interaction between human and automation is something 
more than being only a matter of using automation [10]. What 
we considered as human-automation interaction is bound to 
those who: 
a) Determine limits for automation, that is, specify goals 
and avoidances for the automation. 
b) Start or end automatic processes or improve tasks that 
do the automation. 
c) Provide the automation with information, energy, 
physical objects (requirements) and materials. 
B. Level of Automation 
As stated, the concept of automation level was first 
introduced by P.M. Fitts, where two levels of automation were 
considered (manual or automate) [5]. Further this concept was 
extended by Sheridan and Verplank. They proposed a ten-
degree autonomy level, which has been widely accepted by 
the researchers. The ten levels of automation proposed by 
Sheridan and Verplank are listed in Table 1 [6]. 
 It has been approved that level of automation affects the 
efficiency, situation awareness and mental work load [18]. 
Inagaki et al suggested a level between six and seven [11], and 
Fereidunian et al suggested a level between levels zero and 
one [12], [13]. 
Table I: SHERIDAN’S TAXONOMY FOR LEVELS OF AUTOMATION  
LOA Description 
10 The computer decides everything, acts autonomously, ignoring the human 
9 informs the human only if it, the computer, decides to
8 informs the human only if asked, or 
7 executes automatically, then necessarily informs the human, and 
6 allows the human a restricted time to veto before automatic execution, or 
5 executes that suggestion if the human approves, or
4 suggests one alternative 
3 narrows the selection down to a few 
2 The computer offers a complete set of decision / action alternatives, or 
1 The computer offers no assistance: human must take all decisions and actions 
 
C. Performance Shaping Factors 
The Environmental conditions which affect the 
performance of human-automation systems are represented as 
PSFs. In fact, the LOA can be formulated as a function of 
PSFs. The weather condition, day-time or night-time and 
mental work-load are some instances of the PSFs [19]-[23]. 
D. Why Human-Centered Automation? 
In order to optimize the LOA in the human-automation 
systems, performance of both human and automation in 
different environmental conditions should be assessed first. In 
our application, these environmental conditions are those 
related to the power grid cyber security, either directly or not. 
Automation system is the most important prerequisite for 
achieving the smart grid objectives. Even we can say that 
automation is almost unavoidable from any industrial point of 
view; however, this increase in the level of automation must 
not lead to neglecting human's supervisory control role. 
Especially, in the instances in which human's tacit knowledge 
is necessary, this knowledge cannot be presented in terms of 
rules or data. 
Furthermore, there are some reasons that reduce our reliance 
on the automation systems: First, there could be contingencies 
which have not been seen in the automation system design. In 
this research, these contingencies are referred to the 
automation system intrusiveness by the hackers. Second, the 
immaturity in the automated systems broadens vulnerabilities 
to the potential cyber attackers. This will result in situations, 
in which the human’s tacit knowledge can be helpful. 
IV. METHOD 
A. Problem Statement 
In this paper, the problem is to adapt the LOA of the smart 
grid to the changing environmental conditions, or 
mathematically: 
                          ܮܱܣ ൌ ݂ሺPSFሻ          (1) 
            PSF ൌ ሺܲܵܨଵ, ܲܵܨଶ, … , ܲܵܨ௡ሻ (2) 
This paper differs to that of [15]-[17], in terms of its 
objective function: the objective in this paper is to mitigate the 
cyber security risks for the HAI (the smart grid); whereas, the 
aim in [15]-[17] is to optimize the performance/cost rate of the 
HAI system. 
Until recently, the most common concept, regarding power 
grid cyber security, was isolating the SCADA network from 
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all other networks, preventing attackers from penetrating the 
network [24], [25]. However, increasing demands for 
connecting the consumers and producers, accompanied by the 
spreading IT infrastructure over the smart grid and increase in 
the number of automated operations made the physical 
isolation almost impossible [25]. As a consequence, cyber 
security of the smart grid has drawn great attentions in recent 
years. This paper presents its cyber security strategy in an HAI 
framework. 
 We customized a framework, presented by Fereidunian et 
al [13], [14], for the realization of the adaptive autonomy 
concept to improve the cyber security of the smart grid. The 
framework proposed a subjective approach, known as expert 
judgments, which assesses the human and automation 
systems’ performances based on superior experts' judgments 
[13], [14].  
B. Solution Methodology 
Interactions between the two complex systems (human and 
automation system) emerge to a high level of complexity 
which prevent us from employing the objective (i.e. model 
based) approaches. Instead, we adopt a subjective approach to 
the proposed problem which employs the experts' judgments, 
whose superiority has been confirmed due to their 
involvement in the human-automation (SCADA) systems. 
After extracting the human experts' judgments, we utilize 
them for determining the appropriate LOAs, according to the 
changes in the environmental conditions, referred to as the 
PSFs. Figure 1 shows the proposed methodology for the 
realization of the presented concept, that has conceptually 
been taken from [13]. 
 
Figure 1: The proposed Methodology for Adaptive Autonomy Implementation 
[13] 
C. Cyber Security Performance Shaping Factors 
We classify the environmental conditions affecting the cyber 
security of the smart grid into the following three categories: 
1) Environmental conditions which describe the power grid 
vulnerability at the time of the cyber attack: 
PSF1: Number of weak points in the power grid 
In August 2003, a generating plant went offline at the time 
of high electrical demand in Eastlake, Ohio. The imbalances 
between supply and demand resulted in chain reactions, which 
finally led to the second widespread electrical blackout in the 
history [26], [27]. Although it was not initiated with a cyber 
attack, but such a weak-point could be an ideal chance for a 
potential attacker.   
The increase in the number of weak-points escalates the 
power grid vulnerability. Therefore, it broadens our potential 
attacker’s choices; thus, one should be conservative in 
increasing the LOA in the grids with considerable number of 
weak points. 
PSF 2: Power Grid Complexity 
Power grid complexity is another parameter that affects its 
vulnerability. Complexity introduces new vulnerabilities and 
increasing exposures to potential attackers [28]. As a 
consequence, the attacker could find vulnerabilities that could 
hardly be understood. This will result in absolutely defenseless 
attacks which are very dangerous for the power grid security.  
2) Environmental conditions which describe the ease of 
intrusion to the SCADA system 
PSF 3: Number of Entry Points 
Involvement of the smart grid with innovations has made 
the physical isolation of the SCADA system almost 
impossible. Even if we try to isolate the SCADA system, there 
always is a possibility of having a connection, through a phone 
line or an intranet, to the SCADA system, which is connected 
to a power plant [29]. Moreover, in online monitoring of 
demand—which is one of the smart grid objectives— it is 
essential to establish connections between the consumers and 
the SCADA system. This will increase the number of entry 
points in a great pace. The potential attacker could exploit any 
of these connections in order to access the SCADA network, 
and consequently gain control over the power grid.  
  
PSF 4: Data flow in the IT infrastructure 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and Firewalls are 
responsible for monitoring data flow into the SCADA system. 
However, if the amount of data flowing into the SCADA 
increases, it will be easier for an attacker to intrude the system 
with just a simple Virus, Trojan, Worm, and etc [30]. Increase 
in the data flow of the IT infrastructure increases system’s 
reliability while decreases its security [3]. 
3) Environmental conditions which describe the ease of 
gaining control over the SCADA system 
PSF 5: Anomalies vs. Signatures 
When the defense system fails and an attacker intrudes to 
the SCADA system, the question will be the matter of what 
we should do to minimize and mitigate destructions caused by 
this attack. The destruction mitigation strategy differs if the 
 
Automation System 
Performance, Cost 
and Reliability 
Analysis 
New PSFs 
Human 
Performance, Cost 
and Reliability 
Analysis versus 
Automation
Trade-off Analysis to select the automation Level 
New Level? 
Apply new 
level of 
automation 
Expert 
Judgments 
 
 
Update PSFs 
PSFs changed? 
No
Yes 
Yes 
No 
 4
detected attack is an anomalies or a signature. If the detected 
attack is a signature (i.e. attack looks like prior ones), there 
will be no need to decrease the LOA considerably, because we 
know how to treat the threat. On the other hand, if the detected 
attack is an anomaly (i.e. attacks that we never seen before), it 
is recommended to decrease the LOA until more 
investigations, because we have no experience of such sort of 
events.  
Table II: THE RELATION BETWEEN PSFs AND LOA 
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V. IMPLEMENTATION 
Our implementation is based on the experts’ judgments to 
determine the appropriate LOA for the SCADA system in 
different environmental conditions. For this purpose, first we 
define a PSF vector which describes the conditions of the 
SCADA system from cyber-security point of view. 
A. The PSF Vector  
We define a vector, entitled as a PSF vector, to represent the 
environmental conditions. This vector contains five elements; 
each of them describes one of the previously discussed PSFs. 
In the following, we describe each of these arrays: 
1) PSF element for the number of weak points in the 
power grid (PSF1): We define three different 
conditions for this PSF: few (represented by 0), more 
(represented by 1), and much more (represented by 
2).  
2) PSF element for the power grid complexity (PSF2): 
Like the previous one, three conditions are 
considered for this PSF: little complexity, more 
complexity, and much more complexity. The element 
for this PSF is defined similar to that of the PSF1. 
3) PSF array for the number of entry points (PSF3): Like 
the two previous PSF vectors, we define three states 
for this PSF. 0 for few entry points, 1 for more entry 
points, and much more entry points which will be 
presented by 2. 
4) PSF element for the data flow in the IT infrastructure 
(PSF4): Exactly like the previous ones this array is 
defined by three states. 0 describes little flow of data, 
while 1 depicts higher flow of data, and 2 stands for 
much higher data flow in the IT infrastructure. 
5) PSF sub-vector for the anomalies and signatures 
(PSF5): This sub-vector contains just an element, in 
which 0 stands for the signatures and 1 is for the 
anomalies. 
Representing all of these sub-vectors in a vector as follows 
will result in our PSF vector which describes the SCADA 
system's condition from the cyber-security point of view. 
PSF= [PSF1, PSF2, PSF3, PSF4, PSF5]                  (3) 
 
B. Scenario Development and Results  
In this research, only simple conditions are studied, this 
simplicity facilitates the human experts' judgments and, as a 
consequence, the result will be more reliable. Further studying 
simple conditions is the best way to explore the effects of each 
PSF on our human-automation system. For this reason six 
scenarios are developed, and asked from experts in interviews. 
Superior experts' judgments are employed to evaluate the 
appropriate LOA for each of these scenarios. 
Scenario 1— Happy condition, PSF= [0, 0, 0, 0, 0]: In this 
condition there are few weak points in the power grid. 
Further, its complexity is low and it is possible to determine 
the grid’s vulnerabilities. Moreover, the numbers of entry 
points are few and the flow of data in the IT infrastructure is 
low. In addition to these conditions there is no attack 
detected. As a consequence, this condition is the perfect 
candidate to have maximum LOA from the cyber security 
point of view.        
Scenario 2— Vulnerable condition, PSF= [2, 0, 0, 0, 0]: In 
this condition all of the PSFs are in their normal state except 
PSF1. This situation describes a vulnerable power grid with no 
deficiency other than this vulnerability; in our strategy 
believing that the increase in the number of weak points 
should be accompanied by a decrease in the LOA. Table 2 
illustrates the relation between number of weak-points and the 
LOA. 
Scenario 3— Complex condition, PSF= [0, 2, 0, 0, 0]: In this 
condition we are facing a complex power grid. This 
complexity concurs with non-identified vulnerabilities. Our 
strategy is to reduce the LOA while the complexity of the 
power grid increases. Table 2 shows the relation between 
power grid complexity and the level of automation.    
Scenario 4— Accessible condition, PSF= [0, 0, 2, 0, 0]: In 
this condition we are facing a SCADA network which is 
accessible through many connections like internet 
connections, telephone lines, and etc. In order to increase the 
smart grid’s cyber security, we suggest the reduction of the 
LOA, once the number of the entry points increases. Table 2 
shows this relationship.          
Scenario 5— Pervious condition, PSF= [0, 0, 0, 2, 0]: Once 
the data flow in the IT infrastructure is more than usual,  it is 
easy for our potential attacker to intrude the SCADA system 
with just a simple Virus, Trojan, Worm, and etc [30]. In order 
to overcome this problem, our strategy is to reduce the LOA 
by increasing the data flow in the SCADA system. This 
relation has been demonstrated in Table2.     
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Scenario 6— Unexpected condition, PSF= [0, 0, 0, 0, 1]: In 
this condition, the IDS detects a cyber attack, even if there 
exists the possibility that the attacker has been intruded to the 
SCADA system. If we are facing a never seen attack (which 
means an anomaly), our strategy is to reduce the LOA for 
more investigations. Table 2 reports the relation between this 
PSF and the level of automation. 
VI. DISCUSSIONS 
This paper schemes an adaptive level of automation for 
improving the smart grid's cyber security. For this purpose, 
five PSFs were considered, and their effects on the LOAs were 
discussed from the cyber security point of view. Here we rank 
these PSFs, and determine which one has more influence on 
the appropriate LOA.  
A typical attack can be decomposed into three steps: access, 
discovery, and control [4]. We classify our PSFs into three 
categories; these categories are related to the steps of a cyber 
attack. In the first step our potential attacker is going to 
intrude our system; so PSF3 and PSF4 are directly associated 
with this step. In the second step the attacker should discover 
the system. If the potential attackers have a candidate for their 
attacks (this should be a weak point) they should discover the 
system in order to realize how they can gain control over that 
point. PSF1 and PSF2 are directly involved in this step. At the 
final step the attackers should gain control of the candidate 
point where PSF5 is generally related to this step. 
When the attackers proceed through these three steps, it 
means failure in some defense strategies. This will result in the 
increase in the level of defenselessness; as a consequence the 
level of danger will increase. 
We suppose that our PSFs could be ranked, based on the 
level of danger for these three steps. Figure 2 shows our PSF 
ranking for this research. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: PSFs ranking  
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper introduced a novel framework for the smart grid 
cyber security based on the human-automation interaction 
theory. Five different environmental conditions are presented 
as the system PSFs. Further, it studied that how these PSFs 
affect the cyber security of the smart grid. Afterward, the 
impacts of these PSFs on the level of automation were 
discussed (LOA decreaser or LOA increaser). Finally, these 
PSFs were ranked, based on their effect on the level of 
automation. 
This research will continue with exploring the LOA in 
different environmental conditions, based on superior experts' 
judgments. This research group is working on introducing 
expert systems as a subjective approach for the determination 
of appropriate LOAs from the cyber security point of view.  
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